American Politics Turns on Variance, Not Voters
How Republican Incoherence—and Nothing Else—Is Deciding the Next Election
Washington is a town without pity.
Not because it’s evil—though there’s plenty of that—but because pity is inefficient in systems already under strain. Pity introduces friction. It slows decisions. It complicates blame. And in a political environment spinning too fast to tolerate error, pity is quietly discarded.
This matters because almost everything Americans are told about how change happens right now is wrong.
Protest is supposed to matter.
Voters are supposed to decide outcomes.
Persuasion is supposed to shift the balance.
“Democracy” is supposed to be the mechanism.
None of those claims survive contact with the actual physics of the current system.
I’ve argued for some time that elections no longer function the way people believe they do. That claim reliably provokes discomfort—usually framed as cynicism, abandonment, or partisan pessimism.
But this isn’t about mood or motive.
It’s about pattern recognition.
Despite ineffective protests, Democratic ineptitude, and rising authoritarian fantasy, Washington is likely to change in 2026.
Not because the public demanded it.
Not because leaders rediscovered courage.
Not because the right arguments finally broke through.
Systems that lose coherence do not change gradually. They change when accumulated error outpaces the capacity to correct it. That is what this midterm election is likely to produce.
Think of it as a spinning top. At one speed, the top is gyroscopic. Its angular momentum stabilizes it, making it difficult to tip over or alter its course. Small disturbances are absorbed and corrected.
As the top spins faster, however, those corrections become harder. Minor imbalances—imperfections in mass distribution, construction flaws, material limits—begin to matter. Wobbles that were once damped now persist and amplify.
Eventually, the very rotation that once provided stability generates internal stresses that exceed the system’s ability to hold itself together. The constraints fail. The structure ruptures. The top shatters—not because an external force intervened, but because the system exceeded its own tolerances.
That is the failure mode we are approaching. The GOP is a system accelerating toward the midterms. The question is not whether it wobbles, but how narrow the tolerances have become.
This is not a story about heroism.
Or democracy.
Or freedom.
Or morality.
It is a story about variance.
The Civic Fairytale
The myth of American democracy goes like this: if enough people show up, speak clearly, and vote their conscience, good outcomes will follow. Mr. Smith Goes to Washington. The fantasy of Hartsfield’s Landing—everyone voting at midnight, one hundred percent participation, the system responding faithfully to the will of the people. Democracy’s mechanisms may be slow and imperfect, but they are ultimately responsive. Pressure accumulates. Leaders adjust. The system returns to equilibrium.
I wish it were still so.
The mistake most people are making right now is not apathy. It is temporal mismatch. They are applying a participation model designed for a lower-stress, lower-variance system to one that has already crossed a different threshold.
In a stable political environment, persuasion matters because institutions have slack. They can absorb noise. They can correct mistakes. They can afford to wait for consensus to form. Voters act as a steering mechanism because the system trusts them to do so.
That trust is now gone.
What replaced it is not authoritarian command, but risk management.
Both parties—and their supporters—now believe the U.S. government is illegitimate.
That is literally the only thing they agree on.
Democrats believe the system is illegitimate because the president violates the law with apparent impunity, the courts no longer function as a meaningful check on executive abuse, and Congress appears permanently unwilling to exercise its constitutional role.
Republicans believe the system is illegitimate as a coping mechanism for political incoherence and material disappointment. They voted for a felon, believing it would lower egg prices. It did not. They are now forced to choose between healthcare and food, food and rent, rent and everything else. To reconcile this failure, they cling to conspiratorial explanations—sex-trafficking Democrats, a malevolent “deep state,” fantasies of enrichment through seizing Venezuelan oil or dismantling Greenland. Whatever the narrative, the conclusion is the same: the system exists to harm them.
That alignment is historically unprecedented. The United States has never had both major parties simultaneously conclude that the entire system is broken, arriving there through incompatible epistemic frameworks.
A democracy was not designed for an electorate that cannot agree whether two plus two equals four. When daily headlines feature mutually incompatible versions of reality, endorsed by institutions and sustained without correction, that is not noise.
It is an epistemic failure.
The top is now rotating at the edge of its tolerances.
Why Protest Feels Satisfying but also Hollow
In high-stress systems, the governing question is no longer “What do people want?” It is “What can still be controlled?” That shift quietly reorganizes everything downstream—campaigns, courts, donors, bureaucracies, and eventually elections themselves.
This is why protest feels hollow.
Not because protests are ignored, but because they no longer target the variables that determine outcomes. Marches produce visibility, not constraint. They signal dissent, not cost. They do not reduce error rates, impose legal risk, or alter institutional tolerances.
Protest still performs a social function. It reassures participants they are not alone. It vents pressure that might otherwise metastasize into violence. But it does not steer a system already oriented around containment.
The same is true of persuasion.
Campaigns still behave as though elections are debates to be won—arguments to refine, narratives to align with voter sentiment. That framing assumes the decisive variable is preference.
It isn’t.
The decisive variable is variance.
In a system under this level of stress, politics stops being about gain and becomes about error control. Less What do we want? More Who is going to screw up less?
Which coalition generates fewer unforced errors?
Which candidates create manageable legal exposure?
Which institutions can still certify outcomes without triggering crisis?
Which donors believe their downside risk remains bounded?
Which party’s elites intervene before tolerances collapse?
These are not questions voters answer directly. They are questions elites answer about voters—often defensively, often late, and often imperfectly.
This is why elections feel both pre-decided and volatile at the same time.
They are pre-decided in the sense that many outcomes are shaped before ballots are cast—through candidate filtration, litigation, procedural maneuvering, and risk hedging. They are volatile because the system has lost tolerance for mistakes. Errors that once disappeared into background noise now decide races.
A missed filing deadline.
A reckless statement.
A fringe primary victory.
A poorly drafted law.
A judge forced to intervene.
None of these are democratic choices in the romantic sense.
All of them now determine outcomes.
If the impulse is to “fight the power,” the counterintuitive reality is this: the most effective posture is not confrontation but error suppression on your own side and non-interference on the other. In a high-variance system, outcomes turn less on initiative than on mistake management. Republicans have become convinced of their own invincibility and indulgent excess, and that conviction reliably produces unforced errors. The critical task for Democrats is not escalation, but readiness—being positioned to recognize those errors, allow them to compound, and convert them into a durable advantage when institutions intervene.
Republicans Will “Break First”
If Washington changes in 2026, it will not be because Democrats suddenly became smarter, more principled, or more competent. There is no evidence for that. Democratic dysfunction remains visible and costly.
The reason change is likely is simpler.
The Republican system is operating at the edge of failure.
This is not primarily a story about ideology. It is a story about velocity.
Over multiple cycles, Republicans have adopted a governing posture defined by acceleration: maximalist rhetoric, maximalist power grabs, maximalist policy swings, open norm violation, and a near-total abandonment of restraint. Each choice increases rotational speed. Each narrows tolerance. Each reduces the system’s capacity to absorb error.
At low speed, abuse can be normalized.
At moderate speed, it can be litigated.
At high speed, it becomes destabilizing.
The GOP is now operating at that boundary.
Unbridled executive authority.
Defiance of courts.
Hostility toward allies.
Policy without administrative capacity.
Legislative brinkmanship that treats paralysis as acceptable collateral damage.
Candidate selection that rewards spectacle over competence.
None of this is disqualifying in isolation. What matters is stacking.
When abuses compound faster than institutions can correct them, the response is not moral outrage. It is containment. Courts intervene. Donors hedge. Bureaucracies slow-walk. Leadership insulates where it can and abandons where it must.
Democratic failures create inefficiencies.
Republican failures create emergencies.
A party can survive being uninspiring.
It cannot survive being ungovernable.
That is why Democrats do not need to be right to win.
They only need to be less destabilizing.
Where Stress Accumulates
If the Republican system is operating near its failure tolerances, then the question is not how to force collapse. Systems under this kind of stress do not need to be pushed. They fail on their own when error outpaces correction.
The relevant question is simpler—and colder:
Where does stress accumulate fastest, and when does it convert into an intervention?
Because not all pressure matters equally.
Much of what people fixate on—protests, messaging, outrage cycles—registers as noise. It may feel intense, but it does not meaningfully alter the variables that determine outcomes. In a high-variance system, pressure only matters when it increases error rates, legal exposure, or containment costs.
Everything else is atmospheric.
The places that matter share three characteristics: they are procedural, boring, and unforgiving.
First: Candidate Quality and Filtration
Failure enters the system early.
Primaries are where instability is introduced, not elections. A fringe candidate does not need to win outright to cause damage. They only need to:
force resource diversion,
create reputational spillover,
or generate legal and procedural complications.
Once ballots are printed, tolerances collapse. At that point, the system is managing damage, not selecting talent.
This is why early filtration matters more than late persuasion—and why parties that reward spectacle over discipline burn margin rapidly.
Second: Legal and Procedural Competence
In a low-stress system, sloppy governance can be papered over. In a high-stress system, it becomes fatal.
Poorly drafted laws invite injunctions.
Careless statements trigger litigation.
Defiant officials force judicial escalation.
Procedural shortcuts create constitutional exposure.
None of this requires ideological opposition to matter. It requires only that institutions still function at all.
When the same coalition repeatedly generates legally unsound actions, the system responds not with debate, but with containment. Courts intervene. Bureaucracies slow-walk. External actors step in.
Each intervention raises the cost of the next move.
Third: Donor and Elite Risk Perception
Money is not ideological. It is actuarial.
Donors tolerate extremism longer than commentators expect—but only so long as it remains containable. The moment a coalition appears uninsurable—legally, reputationally, or operationally—support fragments quietly.
This does not look like dramatic defections. It looks like:
hedging,
diversification,
reduced enthusiasm,
conditional support,
and silence where coordination once existed.
That loss of confidence is corrosive because it compounds other failures rather than correcting them.
Fourth: Institutional Fatigue
Institutions can absorb abuse for a long time. They cannot absorb constant abuse without adjustment.
Repeated defiance accelerates fatigue. Fatigued institutions do not collapse heroically. They adapt defensively:
by narrowing discretion,
by escalating oversight,
by preempting risk,
by treating actors as liabilities rather than partners.
This is how governance slows, hardens, and becomes brittle.
And brittleness is the enemy of coalitions that rely on acceleration.
Where Leverage Actually Exists
If the system is operating near failure tolerance, the task is not to push it over the edge.
It will do that on its own.
The task is not to follow it over the cliff.
Primaries and candidate selection matter more than protest. Early filtration matters more than late persuasion. Discipline matters more than catharsis.
The most emotionally gratifying choices are often the strategically worst ones. Put most bluntly, if it feels good, it’s probably the wrong thing to do.
The task is not to hasten Republican collapse, but to avoid sharing it. They are already operating beyond sustainable limits. The only remaining strategic failure is introducing instability by confusing outrage with leverage.
That is the inversion of modern politics.
And history suggests that once systems reach this phase, they rarely slow themselves down.
If this essay clarified how power actually behaves, The Long Memo is where I continue that work.
Paid subscribers get the full analysis: fewer comforting stories, more accurate models, and a consistent focus on what actually determines outcomes in high-stress systems.
If you’re looking for reassurance, this probably isn’t for you.
If you’re looking to stop wasting time on levers that no longer connect, you know what to do.


I'm going to take this as a sober counter argument to what I wrote here...
https://danriley2.substack.com/p/moderation-in-pursuit-of-justice?r=1lxecq
Your diagnosis is spot on. However, the end game remains elusive because it assumes there is some level of democratic responsiveness that will remain that would allow for corrective measures to prevail. I’m not so sure that is accurate.
It’s very possible that it just continues to devolve into extreme brutishness and incompetence with goons in the streets to enforce it at home with Democrats remaining ineffective and a pliant military to enforce blockades for harm and hoped for plunder internationally.
Of course this behavior could trigger a series of wars, hot, cold, financial and trade that will accelerate the decline even faster and throw in other currently unknown variables that scramble the equation in ways we can’t anticipate.